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ABSTRACT

Singla, Ankush. M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. Hardware Accelerated
Authentication System for Dynamic Time-Critical Networks. Major Professor: Elisa
Bertino.

The secure and efficient operation of time-critical networks, such as vehicular networks,
smart-grid and other smart-infrastructures, is of primary importance in today’s society. It
is crucial to minimize the impact of security mechanisms over such networks so that the
safe and reliable operations of time-critical systems are not being interfered.

Even though there are several security mechanisms, their application to smartinfrastructure and Internet of Things (IoT) deployments may not meet the ubiquitous and
time-sensitive needs of these systems. That is, existing security mechanisms either
introduce a significant computation and communication overhead, or they are not
scalable for a large number of IoT components. In particular, as a primary authentication
mechanism, existing digital signatures cannot meet the real-time processing requirements
of time-critical networks, and also do not fully benefit from advancements in the
underlying hardware/software of IoTs.

As a part of this thesis, we create a reliable and scalable authentication system to ensure
secure and reliable operation of dynamic time-critical networks like vehicular networks

viii
through hardware acceleration. The system is implemented on System-On-Chips (SoC)
leveraging the parallel processing capabilities of the embedded Graphical Processing
Units (GPUs) along with the CPUs (Central Processing Units). We identify a set of
cryptographic authentication mechanisms, which consist of operations that are highly
parallelizable while still maintain high standards of security and are also secure against
various malicious adversaries. We also focus on creating a fully functional prototype of
the system which we call a “Dynamic Scheduler” which will take care of scheduling the
messages for signing or verification on the basis of their priority level and the number of
messages currently in the system, so as to derive maximum throughput or minimum
latency from the system, whatever the requirement may be.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Introduction

According to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) there were
32,479 highway fatalities in the year 2011 (Harding, et al., 2014). Another NHTSA study
which accesses the readiness of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication technology for
practical application, estimates that just two of the many possible V2V applications
Intersection Movement Assist (IMA) and Left Turn Assist (LTA) can save 49 to 1,083
lives by preventing these kind of accidents. These kind of applications can harness
vehicular networks to communicate with other vehicles as well as control-centers through
roadside infrastructure.

The secure and efficient operation of time-critical networks, such as the aforementioned
vehicular networks as well as smart-grid and other smart-infrastructures, is of primary
importance in today’s society. It is crucial to minimize the impact of security mechanisms
over such networks so that the safe and reliable operations of time-critical systems are not
being interfered. For instance, if the delay introduced by the crypto operations negatively
affects the time available for braking the car before a collision, a car may not be able to
safely stop in time. Similarly, smart-grid networks require phasor measurement units to
authenticate security sensitive measurements with a very high throughput (e.g., 10002000 messages per second). Finally, the security mechanisms for time-critical networks
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must be highly scalable, since these systems have very large numbers of connected
components.
Even though there are several security mechanisms, their application to smartinfrastructure and Internet of Things (IoT) deployments may not meet the ubiquitous and
time-sensitive needs of these systems. That is, existing security mechanisms either
introduce a significant computation and communication overhead, or they are not
scalable for a large number of IoT components. In particular, as a primary authentication
mechanism, existing implementations of digital signatures cannot meet the real-time
processing requirements of time-critical networks, and also do not fully benefit from
advancements in the underlying hardware/software of IoTs.
The goal of this research is to identify a suite of extremely fast digital signatures and
implement them using hardware-acceleration, to ensure delay-aware authentication in
time-critical networks. This project analyzes and implements real-time digital signature
schemes, and then pushes the performance to the edge via cryptographic hardwareacceleration.
The end result of this research would be to show significantly better throughput and
lower latency of the accelerated authentication algorithms when compared to existing
implementations, along with an ability to handle and schedule messages according to
their priority level.

3
1.2

Scope

The scope of this thesis includes the following:

1. Identify viable authentication mechanisms for hardware-acceleration and
implement these algorithms on server-grade GPUs using their parallel processing
capabilities.
2. Implement these algorithms on System-On-Chips containing GPUs.
3. Create a Dynamic Scheduler to schedule and manage incoming messages and
more importantly leverage the processing capabilities of both CPUs and GPUs at
the same time.
4. Create graphs and charts showing performance comparisons of these
implementations with state-of –the art authentication implementations.

1.3

Assumptions

For successful implementation of our system in the real world we are assuming the
following:
1. There exists a working fault-tolerant and high-bandwidth wireless network for
these authentication messages and signatures to travel from one node to others.
2. There exists a fully functional and reliable key distribution mechanism already in
place and the nodes have their respective private-public keys in place before our
system starts working.
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3. The authentication system is the highest priority program running on the system.
All other programs, for e.g. entertainment or other communication systems can
take a back-seat when the authentication program needs the hardware.

1.4

Limitations

In addition to relying upon the above assumptions to be in place before our system is
operational, it suffers from the following limitations:
1. We do not focus on encrypting the messages while in transit, so as to protect them
from the eyes of a malicious adversary.
2. The receiving nodes may not have a way to get the public keys of the transmitting
nodes while they are moving at a fast speed.
3. Fault tolerance needs to be built into the system. There is no way now for
knowing whether the message was received by the intended node and passed
verification or not.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

2.1

Introduction

In the following sections, we give an understanding of the state-of-the art authentication
algorithms being used and a preliminary analysis including the benefits and the
shortcomings of the same. In the section 2.3, we describe the existing hardwareaccelerated implementations of various cryptographic mechanisms.

2.2

Existing Authentication Mechanisms

We outline the advantages and limitations of authentication mechanisms that are most
relevant to our work.

Message Authentication Codes and Standard Digital Signatures: Symmetric crypto based
authentication mechanisms rely on Message Authentication Code (MAC) (Menezes,
Oorschot, & Vanstone, 1996). Despite their simplicity and computational efficiency,
MAC-based methods are not practical for broadcast authentication in large-scale
distributed systems [ (Luk, Perrig, & Whillock, 2006), (Boneh, Lynn, & Shacham,
2004) ], as they require a pairwise key distribution requirement among all the signers and
verifiers. These methods also cannot achieve non-repudiation and public verifiability.
Digital signatures (e.g., RSA (Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman, 1978), ECDSA (American
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Bankers Association, 1999)) rely on Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) (Menezes,
Oorschot, & Vanstone, 1996), which make them publicly verifiable and scalable for large
systems. Hence, they are considered as a primary authentication mechanism for largescale delay-aware systems such as vehicular networks and smart-grid systems. For
instance, the vehicular WAVE architecture mandates (IEEE, 2014) the use of PKI
mechanisms to digitally sign critical messages [ (IEEE, 2013), (Vinel, Campolo, Petit, &
Koucheryavy, 2011), (Mammeri, Petit, & Zoubir, 2013)]. Smart-grids require
ubiquitously deployed phasor measurement units to authenticate sensitive measurements
with a very high throughput (e.g., up to 120 messages per second) [ (Robin Berthier,
2013), (IEEE, 2011)]). Despite their scalability, standard digital signature schemes
require several expensive operations such as modular exponentiation and pairing (e.g.,
BLS (Boneh, Lynn, & Shacham, 2004)). Therefore, they are not suitable for time-critical
authentication. It has been shown that they introduce significant delays which for safety
reasons are unacceptable in time-critical networks such as vehicular networks
[ (Mammeri & Zoubir, 2010), (Mammeri, Petit, & Zoubir, 2013), (Vinel, Campolo, Petit,
& Koucheryavy, 2011)].

Delayed Key Disclosure and Amortized Signatures: Delayed key disclosure methods
[ (Perrig, Canetti, Song, & Tygar, 2000) , (Perrig, Canetti, Song, & Tygar, 2001), (Perrig,
Canetti, Song, & Tygar, 2002)] are efficient and compact as they introduce an asymmetry
between signer and verifier via a time factor. However, these methods require packet
buffering, and therefore cannot achieve immediate verification (which is vital for delayaware authentication). Signature amortization methods (e.g.,
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(Song, Zuckerman, & Tygar, 2002), (Lysyanskaya, Tamassia, & Triandopoulos, 2004),
(Wong & Lam, 1999), (Miner & Staddon, 2001)) compute a signature over a set of
messages instead of individual message. Hence, the cost of signature generation and
verification is amortized over multiple messages. However, these methods require packet
buffering and introduce packet loss risk due to the use of hash-chains.

Cryptographic Hardware Acceleration with GPUs: Symmetric ciphers and RSA for SSL
have been implemented, accelerated and benchmarked using General Purpose GPUs
(GPGPUs) [ (Gilger, Barnickel, & Meyer, 2012), (Jang, Han, Han, Moon, & Park,
2011)]. AES related GPU based acceleration techniques have been investigated in the
CUDA framework [ (Li, Zhong, Zhao, Mei, & Chu., 2012), (Iwai, Kurokawa, &
Nisikawa, 2010)]. There are numerous other studies that leverage Graphic Processing
Units (GPU)s, but we limit the discussion because of space constraints. Discrete GPUs
have several limitations such as high operating power usage and size, hence they have not
been deployed in cars. NVIDIA, as a major GPU manufacturer and our collaborator in
this work, has moved towards implementing the Tegra SoCs, which are being deployed
in newer Audi and Tesla models. In [ (Yan, Shi, & Fei, 2009), (Mane, Judge, &
Schaumont, 2011)], modular arithmetic accelerations with embedded Digital Signal
Processing (DSP) cores in SoC have been developed. In (Pabbuleti, Mane, Desai, Albert,
& Schaumont, 2013), an ECC implementation for the Venom (NEON) co-processor in
Qualcomm’s Scorpion (ARM) Central Processing Unit (CPU), with Streaming SIMD
Extensions (SSE2) instruction-set in Intel’s Atom CPU, was developed. However, none
of these studies has explored the collaboration between GPU and CPU in modern SoC
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co-processor architectures. To the best of our knowledge, only the work in (Wang,
Xiong, Yun, & Cavallaro, 2013), which is outside of the crypto domain, has explored the
GPU/CPU coordination. In (Glas, Sander, Stuckert, M¨uller-Glaser, & Becker, 2011), an
ECDSA acceleration on reconfigurable hardware has been proposed, which offers some
performance improvements. However, such approaches do not incorporate the ARMbased hardware design architecture of a SoC. Our proposed methods in SoCs are built
using systems already existing in cars, and also show better performance.

In (Singla, Mudgerikar, Papapanagiotou, & Yavuz, 2015), we describe HardwareAccelerated Authentication (HAA) derived from RA (Rapid Authentication) scheme
(Yavuz, 2014) and showed its application to vehicular networks. HAA significantly
improves the performance of offline-online constructions. That is, HAA-2048 (GPU) is
x18, x6, and x3 times faster than the current CPU implementation of RSA, ECDSA and
RA (Yavuz, 2014), respectively, for the same level of security. Figures 3, 4 and 5 indicate
results when these optimizations are performed on an Nvidia Tegra K1 SoC with 192
Nvidia CUDA Cores on its GPU. Figures 6, 7 and 8 indicate results when these
optimizations are performed on an Nvidia Tesla K40c server-grade GPU containing 2880
Nvidia CUDA Cores. Figure 9 illustrates the results when the CPU cores and GPU are
used in conjunction to divide the processing workload.

2.3

Cryptographic Hardware Acceleration with GPUs

Symmetric ciphers and RSA for SSL have been implemented, accelerated and
benchmarked using General Purpose Graphic Processing Units (GPGPUs) [30, 43]. AES-
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related GPU-based acceleration techniques have been investigated for the Compute
Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) framework in (Li, Zhong, Zhao, Mei, & Chu.,
2012) and (Iwai, Kurokawa, & Nisikawa, 2010). Discrete GPUs have several limitations
such as high operating power usage and size, hence they have not been deployed in cars.
NVIDIA, as a major GPU manufacturer, has moved towards implementing the Tegra
SoCs, which are being deployed in Audi and Tesla models. None of these prior studies
have explored the collaboration between GPU and CPU in modern SoC co-processor
architectures. To the best of our knowledge, only the work in (Wang, Xiong, Yun, &
Cavallaro, 2013), which is outside of the crypto domain, has explored the GPU/CPU
coordination in an older version of SoC. In (Glas, Sander, Stuckert, M¨uller-Glaser, &
Becker, 2011), an ECDSA acceleration on reconfigurable hardware has been proposed,
which offers some performance improvements.

10

CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

The proposed authentication system involves a network of individual nodes
communicating among each other and with a central command-center. The authentication
algorithm will be processed on System-On-Chips (SoC) installed inside the nodes. For
the purposes of this section, we will talk about the vehicular networks, but any similar
dynamic and time-critical network can replace them. We also discuss the parallelization
techniques used in our recent paper describing Hardware Accelerated Authentication
(Singla, Mudgerikar, Papapanagiotou, & Yavuz, 2015) using Rapid Authentication
(Yavuz, 2014)

3.1

The Network Nodes

The authentication apparatus described is perfectly suitable for deployment in real-time
and critical networks, such as Vehicular Networks. The vehicles will serve as individual
nodes in the vast peer-to-peer internetwork of vehicles, command-centers, traffic lights
and other relevant Internet of Thing devices in the immediate vicinity. The vehicles will
have to obtain some kind of a cryptographic certificate for identification of an authorized
user. This will be provided by some existing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authority,
the details of which are outside the purview of this thesis.
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The vehicles in the network are expected to generate messages at a really high rate due to
the advanced sensing technologies and latest interconnected services being
mainstreamed. As and when the autonomous capabilities are increased in these vehicles,
the reliance on these sensors will increase manifold to navigate the roads and highways
safely and quickly. This will introduce algorithms, which rely on the spatial positioning
of the vehicles relative to each other, so as to avoid any collisions, bottlenecks in traffic
and minimize the journey duration. This will further increase the rate of generation of
messages and will burden any authentication schemes deployed to process such huge
number of messages, almost in real-time.

3.2

System-on-Chip requirements

Big car manufacturers like Audi, Volkswagen, and BMW have already started rolling out
car models with Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) enabled System-on-chip (SoC)
capabilities. The most noted SoCs being used for providing automotive solutions are the
Nvidia Jetson (with Nvidia Tegra GPU) and Qualcomm Snapdragon (with Adreno GPU).
These are currently being used for various services like interactive HUD displays,
navigation map services, entertainment services and much more.
We will particularly focus on the Nvidia Tegra K1 SoC for the purposes of this research.
Nvidia Tegra is the most logical first choice due to its easy to program CUDA API,
development tools integration into Visual Studio and Eclipse, results visualizer to locate
the performance bottlenecks and widespread availability. These SoCs have added
benefits of being energy efficient, having a small form factor and quite sturdy.
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3.3

Hardware Accelerated Rapid Authentication Scheme

The Hardware Accelerated Authentication scheme a.k.a. HAA (Singla, Mudgerikar,
Papapanagiotou, & Yavuz, 2015) is derived from RA (Rapid Authentication) scheme
(Yavuz, 2014). RA exploits already existing structures in the vehicular communication
messages to enable pre-computation for signature schemes like RSA. The main idea of
RA is to leverage the fact that the numbers of possible sub-messages in a command and
control message are limited. Hence, it is possible to pre-compute and store a RSA
signature on each of those sub-messages during the offline phase. When a message is to
be signed in the online phase, the signer combines individual RSA signatures of relevant
sub-messages via Condensed-RSA (Tsudik & Mykletun, 2006), which requires only a
few modular multiplications. The verification of this signature is also efficient, as it
requires a standard RSA signature verification plus a few modular multiplications.
The Rapid Authentication scheme is modified in order to be implemented on GPUs to
produce the faster and more scalable HAA. Various optimizations in both the RA scheme
and the RSA algorithm have been made to maximize the number of parallel operations, in
order to harness the power of the GPUs.
The other optimization techniques used in the implementation are described as follows:

3.3.1

Inter Message Parallelization

In our HAA scheme, message components are processed in batches both in the online and
offline phase. Each message as defined in the RA scheme is processed in parallel. This
means that multiple threads perform the signing and verifying operations for multiple
messages at once concurrently in the GPU.
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3.3.2

Intra Message Parallelization

Besides processing messages in batches, RSA signature and verification algorithms are
optimized to improve performance in GPUs by using the Chinese remainder theorem
(only signing) and other optimizations like Montgomery multiplication and Sliding
Window techniques. These optimizations have been implemented in (Jang, Han, Han,
Moon, & Park, 2011) for RSA encryption and decryption. These techniques form the
building blocks for the HAA implementation.

3.3.3

Restoring depleted random masks using Offline Stage while signing

In (Yavuz, 2014) and most of the online/offline schemes, it is assumed that the messages
generated in the offline stage are pre-computed and it will not affect the performance of
the online stage. This is not true for a real world scenario where the pre-computed
random masks included with each message might get exhausted really quickly which will
then have to be generated in real time in the online phase. The HAA scheme addresses
this problem by generating the pre-computed messages (offline stage) on the GPUs in
batches in real time using GPU acceleration. This will significantly improve the
performance of the scheme in real world scenarios where the number of messages
generated per unit time is pretty high.

3.3.4

Other Hardware Acceleration Techniques

To accelerate the RA, we leveraged the parallel processing and optimization capabilities
of GPUs both on server and embedded in the SoCs. We have made several optimizations
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to parallelize the individual steps of RA algorithm. We also used optimizations specific to
the architecture of the GPU to realize the full potential of the available cores.

Batch Processing: Message components are processed in batches. That is, the crypto
operations for multiple messages are performed concurrently in the GPU. This requires
that a batch of messages be passed to the GPU, instead of a single message, for signing or
verification.

Breakup of components into words: To optimize the throughput on the GPU, each
message component is divided into words of size 32/64 bit, depending on the GPU
capabilities. Each operation being run on a single thread is run over words rather than
entire message components. We use standard multi-precision algorithms~\cite{mp} to
represent and perform operations between large integers.

GPU warp size utilization: Warps are set of threads (generally 32) that are considered as
one single execution unit inside a CUDA block. To gain maximum throughput from the
GPU, it is necessary to attain the maximum number of active warps per streaming
multiprocessor, which is 64 in our case. We achieve this by adjusting the number of
threads per block to the optimal value.

Memory latency vs GPU Occupancy: The size of the shared memory can limit the
number of active warps on the GPU at a particular point in time by reducing the
occupancy of the Streaming Multiprocessors (SM). The other limiting factor in the

15
performance output is the number of reads and writes on the global memory on the
device.
We attain an optimum balance between the SM occupancy and the Global memory
read/write latency through testing various permutations of memory allocations among the
shared and global memory.

Constant Length Non-Zero Window Technique: We scan the bits of the exponent from the
least significant to the most significant. At each step, we compute a zero window or a
non-zero window (Koç, 1995). With the binary square-and-multiply method, we can
process these windows and reduce the number of modular multiplications, making the
exponentiation algorithm faster.

3.4

Dynamic Scheduler

We propose a “Dynamic Scheduler” prototype, which is a system capable of
authenticating messages on-the-fly according to the priority requirements of the
individual messages. The components of the prototype are detailed below:

3.4.1

Message Structure

SAE J2735, published in November 2009 specifies Basic Safety Message (BSM) as a
standard message structure for vehicular networks.
According to a recent NHTSA report on readiness for V2V technology (Harding, et al.,
2014) “the BSM is used to exchange safety data regarding vehicle state. The message is
broadcast routinely to surrounding vehicles with a variety of data content. The BSM is
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split into two parts to guarantee that the core information for vehicle safety (Part I) has
priority and is transmitted more often. It also minimizes the amount of data
communicated (most of the time) between devices, helping to reduce channel
congestion”. A message structure is shown in the Fig. 2 in Appendix.

3.4.2

Concurrent Priority Queue

A Concurrent Priority Queue will be created for storing the messages as they come and
feed them to the scheduler when ready. The queue would be a FIFO (First-in-First-out)
queue but dependent on the priority levels of the respective messages. Since there will be
a huge number of messages generated per second in a real-time vehicular network, there
will still be certain latency (however small) introduced by the authentication operations.
Some kinds of messages like a certain vehicle crash, losing steering control, brake failure
cannot afford being buffered and waiting for being processed. While some other not so
critical messages like location updates, weather details, news services can afford a certain
minimal amount of latency without affecting any safety of the vehicle.
So, a priority queue is being proposed which will contain the messages according to their
priority. The queue as described in Figure 1 will be a First-in-First-out (FIFO) data
structure where the processor(s) just pick up the next message from the front of the queue
and run the authentication algorithm on it. The incoming messages however get inserted
at their respective positions in the priority queue according to their priority. The messages
will contain a priority field inside the definition which will be predefined. The immediate
messages will have priority assigned as 0. The other non-immediate messages can be
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assigned priorities according to their urgency. The lower the priority number the higher
the priority.
As and when the messages are generated the system will look for the suitable location to
insert the message. The messages will be inserted after the messages of priority equal to
its own but before the messages having priority lesser than it. This will allow non-preemptive preferential processing of the messages according to their urgency and critical
nature. The queue should be able to:
a. Take messages from multiple sources.
b. Keep a count of the number of messages.
c. Keep a count of immediate/non-immediate messages.
d. The queue should put in messages according to their priority level. The highest
priority messages should be added in the front.

3.4.3

Scheduler

We define a scheduler for the process, which will decide which processor CPU/GPU will
process the messages in the queue and the amount of messages to be fed to the GPU at
once. We identify a threshold value \tau as the minimum number of messages fed to the
GPU at once, when it starts outperforming the CPU in terms of the throughput obtained
while cryptographically processing the messages. This threshold value will be different
for each model of a SoC because the different CPUs and GPUs embedded into those will
give different performance results according to their computing capabilities. Once the
threshold value is generated, it will be fixed for the lifetime of that SoC, as this will not
change.
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The dynamic scheduler proposed will check the number of the non-immediate (priority ≠
0) messages in the queue. If it comes out to be greater than \tau, the scheduler will hand
over all of these to the GPU to authenticate these messages in a batch. This decision will
be required to be made on 2 occasions:
1. When the GPU has processed the message batch assigned to it and has just
become idle.
2. Whenever a new non-immediate message is inserted.
There are a few things to consider here. The CPU no matter what will always process the
immediate messages. We assume that the immediate messages, for e.g., vehicle crash,
losing steering control, brake failure will be a rare occurrence and never exceed the \tau
value at one time even under extreme circumstances. The other thing to consider is that
the length of the queue will have to be defined so as to accommodate any number of
messages that may be generated in a certain period of time. This will also depend on the
execution speed of the processors deployed in the vehicle but it can be taken as a fairly
huge constant value. A scheduler capable of taking the messages from the queue and
should be able to:
a. Make a decision on the appropriate processor to feed them to the e.g. CPU, GPU
based on an optimum decision tree.
b. Keep in view the minimum number of messages after which the GPU starts
giving faster throughput than the CPU.
c. Schedule the immediate messages for minimum latency.
d. Schedule the messages on the basis of priority level.
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e. Schedule the messages for Signature or Verification algorithm based on the
requirement.

3.4.4

Network Sender/Receiver

A Network Sender/Receiver for sending and listening the messages over the network. It
should be able to:
a. Take messages from the scheduler and send the messages to the desired recipient.
b. Listen to the messages over a designated port and pass it along to the priority
queue for signature verification.
c. Scale for the type of networks it is in i.e. should be able to handle high volume of
messages at a given time without any loss.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

We compare our scheme with some standard signature schemes such as RSA (2048-bit
with e = 216 + 1) and ECDSA (256-bit ECC-based signature) in terms of the end-to-end
crypto delay in Table 1. According to BSI standards (ECRYPT, II, 2007), 2048-bit RSA
provides the same level of security as 256-bit ECDSA. We assume that we can precompute and store 4096 signatures. If the number of messages exceeds 4096 then the
offline tokens are replenished. This is a fair assumption in vehicular networks, which
have an average message throughput of 3000 messages per sec. For the processing of
8192 messages, RSA incurs an end-to-end delay of 4 msec/message while ECDSA with
pre-computation incurs an end-to-end delay of 1.18 msec/message (Shamus, MIRACL).
HAA outperforms both these schemes, x18 times better than RSA and x6 times better
than ECDSA, respectively, with an end-to-end delay of 0.21 msec/message seconds.

We focus on comparing the delay and throughputs between HAA and RA, as we found
out that RA is the best scheme among the existing alternatives in terms of end-to-end
delay (0.69 msec/message). Each component size is fixed to be 512 bytes for our
experiments. We have used two configurations for our experiments, server and SoC
settings. We have shown the evaluation results by comparing the GPU results to their
CPU counterparts for the offline sign, online sign and verify stages of RA. We present
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the results in Figures: 3 – 8, both on the server and the SoC configuration with
parameters a = 32, e =216 + 1 and |n|=2048.

Test Infrastructure: One is a server configuration with Nvidia Tesla K40c GPU with
2880 cores and a Base clock rate of 745 Mhz. It has an Intel i7-5930K CPU with a clock
rate of 3.50 GHz. The Tesla K40c has the Kepler architecture and a CUDA compute
capability of 3.5.

The other is a System-On-Chip (SoC) configuration with the Nvidia Jetson TK1
development kit, which has an Nvidia Tegra K1 chipset. The Tegra K1 chipset has an
embedded Kepler GPU with 192 CUDA cores and a base clock rate of 852 Mhz. It also
has a 4-Plus-1 quad-core ARM Cortex A15 CPU with clock rate of 2.3 Ghz. The GPU in
the Tegra is based on the Kepler architecture, which is the same architecture as the Tesla
K40c used for the server configuration. It has a compute capability of 3.2.
TABLE 1: Average end-to-end crypto delay comparison (signature generation plus verification time).

Scheme

End-to-end Crypto Delay (msec)

RSA-2048 (CPU)

4

ECDSA-256 (CPU)

1.18

RA-2048 (CPU)

0.69

RA-2048 (CPU on SoC)

7.1

HAA-2048 (GPU)

0.21

HAA-2048 (GPU on SoC)

2.6
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4.1

HAA (Server)

In the offline sign stage, for 8160 messages, we achieve x3 times more throughput with
our GPU optimizations compared to CPU only implementations. In the online sign stage,
we achieve high throughput gains up to x7 times. In the verify stage, the gain is around
x1.3 times. These results are outlined in Figures: 6, 7 and 8 respectively.

In terms of execution time, the GPU can process a message in 0.337, 0.021, 0.024
milliseconds for the offline, online and verify stages of the algorithm respectively. This is
approximately x2.91, x7.67, x1.28 times faster than the corresponding CPU execution
times. The GPU gives a worse performance than the CPU if we are processing a very
small number of messages. This is mainly due to the low clock speeds of the GPU cores
as compared to the CPU and also due to the time taken to copy the data to the GPU
memory from the CPU memory and back. We find that all the three stages Online,
Offline and verify perform faster in GPU than CPU for message batches greater than 32,
224 and 900 respectively.

4.2

HAA (SoC)

In the offline sign stage, for 8160 messages, we achieve x3.1 times more throughput with
our GPU optimizations compared to CPU only implementations. In the online sign stage,
we achieve high throughput gains up to x4.1 times. In the verify stage, the throughput of
the GPU implementation hovers around the CPU throughput albeit a little less than it.
The reason is explained later in the section. These results are outlined in Appendix
Figures: 3, 4 and 5.
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In terms of execution time, the Tegra GPU can process a message in 3.40, 0.33, 0.53
milliseconds for the offline, online and verify stages of the algorithm respectively. This is
approximately x3.09, x4.16, x0.86 times the corresponding CPU execution times. We
find the stages Online sign and Offline sign perform faster in GPU than CPU for message
batches greater than 96 and 32 respectively. The GPU verify stage performs worse than
the CPU on the Tegra for all message batch sizes. The reason for the lower gains in the
verify stage for the GPU optimizations are as follows.

•

Double the copy operations in verify stage: In the verify stage, two GPU kernels
(units of execution in GPU) are being executed, modular multiplication and
modular exponentiation, as opposed to the online and offline stages where there is
only a single GPU kernel being executed. Due to two GPU kernel being executed
one after the other, there is a waiting time between memory copy operations from
host memory to device memory and then back. This adversely impacts the overall
execution time of the verify stage in GPU.

•

Modular exponentiation with public key exponent: RSA public key exponent is
generally selected small (e.g., e=216 + 1) to enable fast signature verification. In
this case, since e<<d, the optimizations made in GPUs for speeding up modular
exponentiation are less significant.

24
4.3

Dynamic Scheduler (Server)

In the offline sign stage, for 4096 messages, we achieve x4 times more throughput with 8
CPU threads instead of 1. For 16 CPU threads we get around x5 times the throughput as
compared to just 1 CPU thread. This is expected, as we are using an Intel i7-5930K CPU
with 6 physical and 12 logical cores. Multithreading allows us to put all of those cores to
use. This performance gain almost plateaus after 16 threads, as there are only so many
CPU cores for processing. In the online sign stage, we achieve similar throughput gains
of x4 and x5 for 8 and 16 CPU threads respectively as compared to just a single CPU
thread. The verification stage results are also similar. These results are outlined in
Figures: 9, 10 and 11 respectively.

Moving on to the results where we use CPU and GPU at the same time we gain more
performance benefits as expected. At its highest level i.e. when using 16 CPU threads and
GPU together we get x9 times the performance as compared to a single CPU thread and
x3 times the performance when compared to only GPU in the offline stage. We get
almost similar results for the online signing and the verification stage.
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Fig 1: Concurrent Priority Queue
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Fig 2. Part 1 of Basic Safety Message (SAE)
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Fig 3. Verification Results for HAA-SOC

Fig 4. Sign-online results for HAA-SOC
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Fig. 5: Sign Offline results for HAA-SOC

Fig. 6: Sign Online results for HAA
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Fig. 7: Sign Offline results for HAA
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Fig. 8: Verification results for HAA

Fig. 9: Offline Stage results for DS (CPU+GPU)

36

Fig. 10: Online Stage results for DS (CPU+GPU)

Fig. 11: Verification Stage results for DS (CPU+GPU)
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Fig. 12: Depiction of the vehicular network structure

